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Abstract 
 
It is natural to wonder about contract law’s relationship to the morality of 
promises and agreements. This Chapter distinguishes two ways to conceive of 
that relationship. First, parties’ agreement-based moral obligations might figure 
into the explanation of contract law—into an account of its functions or 
justifications. Contract law might serve to enforce parties’ first-order 
performance obligations, to enforce second-order remedial obligations, to 
support the culture of making and keeping agreements more generally, or at 
least to do no harm to that culture or to people’s ability to act morally. Second, 
contract can be understood as the legal analog to promise. Both contract and 
promise enable people to undertake new obligations to one another when they 
wish. Each is a type of normative power, the one legal, the other moral. The 
Chapter concludes by arguing that these two ways of thinking about contract 
law are not mutually exclusive. Contract law both imposes on parties to 
exchange agreements a legal obligation to perform for reasons independent of 
the parties’ possible contractual intent, and confers on them the power to 
undertake that legal obligation when they so intend because they so intend. 
 
Introduction 
Private law concerns legal obligations persons owe one another. It is 
therefore natural to ask about private law’s relationship to the moral sphere, 
which includes many similarly structured obligations. When it comes to contract 
law, the obvious place to look is the moral obligations that attach to promises 
and agreements. 
This chapter examines the relationship between contract law and 
morality. Part One describes the conceptions of contract, promise, agreement, 
and voluntary obligation used in the chapter. Part Two discusses ways in which 
parties’ moral obligations might explain their contractual ones. Part Three 
describes alternative accounts that do not explain contract law by way of 
 
1 Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. I am grateful to Hanoch Dagan, Jed Lewinsohn and 
Benjamin Zipursky for very helpful comments on a draft of this chapter. 
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parties’ moral obligations, but picture the power to contract as a legal analog to 
the moral power of promising. Part Four suggests a pluralist theory of contract 
law, which recognizes several relationships between contract law and the moral 
sphere. 
This chapter does not address all of contract law’s possible functions or 
justifications. Several scholars have recently emphasized, for example, contract 
law’s role in markets, whose social and political functions extend beyond 
individual morality.2 Those aspects of contract law lie beyond this chapter’s 
scope. 
1 Basic Concepts 
Contract, promise and agreement are contested concepts. One finds in 
the literature various conceptions of each, and a theorist’s conception typically 
reflects her substantive commitments. This Part identifies the conceptions I 
employ and compares them to others one finds in the literature. 
1.1 Contracts 
This chapter employs a catholic, nondoctrinal conception of contract. A 
contract, as I will use the term, is a collection of legally enforceable voluntary, 
chosen obligations between two or more persons acting in their private 
capacities.3 Contractual obligations are voluntary in the sense that they are 
acquired by voluntary acts, such as entering into an exchange agreement or 
signing a formal document. They are chosen in the sense that the parties’ 
choices determine, at least in part, the content of the obligation.4 Most tort 
duties are neither voluntary nor chosen. The legal obligations that traditionally 
attach to marriage are voluntary but not chosen. Contractual obligations are 
both. 
The fact that contractual obligations are chosen is connected to their 
content independence. If A has a contractual obligation to x, it is not because 
the law deems A’s doing x worthy, but because the law deems A’s choice to 
commit herself to xing to be a reason that A should have a legal obligation to x. 
The content of the legal obligation—A’s duty to x—is not the reason for the 
obligation. This does not mean that A can contract for anything under the sun. A 
contract for murder will not be enforced. Nor does it mean that social values 
play no role in determining the content of A’s contractual obligations. Contracts 
 
2 See Roy Kreitner, Voicing the Market: Extending the Ambition of Contract 
Theory, 69 U. TORONTO L.J. 295 (2019). 
3 More precise would be to substitute in the above sentence “jural relations” for 
“obligations,” as contracts can also generate privileges, powers, immunities and 
so forth. I focus on duties for the sake of simplicity. 
4 The choice might be made by both parties, as in a negotiated agreement or 
only one, as in a contract of adhesion. 
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often include mandatory terms, such as minimum wages or the implied 
warranty of habitability. Default terms and altering rules can be crafted in light 
of social interests and made sticky.5 And in resolving ambiguities, a court might 
prefer an interpretation that is consistent with public policy. The point is simply 
that the act of contracting can transform a legally neutral act into a legally 
required one. 
In Anglo-American Law one can enter into a contract in any of several 
ways. Most common today is the informal contract, which is generated by an 
exchange agreement, or an agreement “for consideration.”6 To enter into an 
informal contract, parties must agree to a quid pro quo involving one or both’s 
future acts or obligations. There are no formal requirements. Thus the 
agreement might be express or implied, and if express, oral or written. 
In jurisdictions that still recognize the seal, one can also enter into a 
contract by undertaking a commitment in a signed and sealed writing delivered 
to the obligee. Unlike informal contracts, these formal contracts require neither 
consideration nor acceptance.7 Compliance with the formal requirements 
suffices. 
The catholic conception of contract also captures duties generated by 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which provides that a person acquires a 
legal obligation by making a commitment on which the promisee foreseeably 
and detrimentally relies, if nonenforcement of the commitment would be 
unjust.8 Promissory estoppel is today commonly thought of as an alternative to 
liability in contract. But when Williston introduced the idea, he treated reliance 
as a substitute for consideration, resulting in a contract like any other.9 And 
coming from a very different perspective, Grant Gilmore argued that promissory 
 
5 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1598–1600 (1999); Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of 
Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1738–53, 
1755–58 (1997). Because impeding altering rules can provide gradations of 
stickiness, there is in fact a range of possibilities between chosen and 
nonchosen obligations. See Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory 
of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2084–2113 (2012). Fiduciary obligations, for 
example, lie somewhere between entirely chosen and entirely mandatory. See 
Gregory Klass, What If Fiduciary Obligations Are Like Contractual Ones?, in 
CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 93 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2017). 
6 The exchange conception of consideration is today the dominant one. For an 
argument for an alternative, see Jed Lewinsohn, Paid on Both Sides: Quid Pro 
Quo Exchange and the Doctrine of Consideration, 129 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 
2020). 
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT §§ 95, 104 (1981). 
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 90(1) (1981).  
9 See Samuel Williston, 2 THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 139, at 307–14 (1920) 
(“Estoppel as a substitute for consideration.”).  
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estoppel “has, in effect, swallowed up the bargain principle.”10 The catholic 
conception of contract is designed to accommodate such claims. 
Common law jurisdictions differ on whether the existence of an 
informal contract depends on the parties’ intent to be legally bound.11 The 
black-letter law in England and elsewhere in the Commonwealth requires that 
parties intend to contract. “For a contract to come into existence, there must be 
. . . an intention to create legal relations.”12 In the United States, the Second 
Restatement states that “[n]either real nor apparent intention that a promise be 
legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a manifestation of 
intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the 
formation of a contract.”13 The American rule admits of exceptions. A U.S. court 
might look to the parties’ intent to contract in cases involving, for example, 
preliminary agreements, interfamily agreements, and reporters’ promises of 
confidentiality. 
It is an interesting question whether this difference in black-letter rules 
makes a difference in practice. Several scholars have argued that courts apply 
the English rule as cover for policy judgments. When the court finds 
enforcement of the agreement unproblematic, it does not inquire into the 
parties’ contractual intent; when it wishes to deny enforcement, it finds the 
parties contractual intent lacking.14 Others have argued that in the United 
States, the consideration requirement serves as a proxy test for the parties’ 
intent to contract, so U.S. law too is designed to sort for a contractual intent.15 
As is not uncommon, scholars’ interpretations of the rule and its application 
often correlate with their broader views on contract law’s function and 
justification. The above conception of contract accommodates both the 
American and English rules for contractual intent. 
 
10 Grant Gilmore, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 72 (Columbus: Ohio State U. Press 
1974). 
11 See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 1437 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1443–53, 1475–79 
(2009). 
12 Baird Textile Holdings Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274, [59] 
(Eng.). 
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 21 (1981). 
14 See P.S. Atiyah, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 153 (5th ed. 1995) 
(arguing that the English rule’s presumption of intent to contract means that in 
most cases it is “more realistic to say that no positive intention to enter into 
legal relations needs to be shown.”); Stephen Hedley, Keeping Contract in Its 
Place—Balfour v. Balfour and the Enforceability of Informal Agreements, 5 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1985); Mary Keyes & Kylie Burns, Contract and the 
Family: Whither Intention?, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 577 (2002). 
15 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941); 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 313 
(1986). 
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The relevance vel non of the parties’ legal intent is clearer when it 
comes to formal contracts and promissory estoppel. Employing a formality like 
the seal is just an expression of the sealer’s intent that the document be legally 
effective. The rules for formal contracts therefore sort for parties’ contractual 
intent. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, in distinction, with its emphasis on 
reliance and the demands of justice, appears not to require that the promisor 
intend to acquire a legal commitment.16 Thus in Cohen v. Cowles Media, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court could hold both that a reporters’ confidentiality 
promise did not create a contract because it was not made with an intent to be 
legally bound, and that the source might nonetheless bring a claim of 
promissory estoppel.17 
1.2 Promises 
This chapter employs a relatively narrow conception of promises: a 
promise to x is the expression of an intention to acquire a moral obligation to x 
by that very expression.18 This definition does not address several important 
theoretical questions, such as whether a successful promisor must actually 
intend to acquire a promissory obligation (one can express an intention without 
having it) or whether one can promise by accident (one can express something 
unintentionally). Nor does it take a position on whether promissory obligations 
 
16 It is difficult to say anything substantive about promissory estoppel without 
someone pushing back against it. Compare Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, 
Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and 
Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 496 (1987) (“In most cases in which 
liability is imposed only on the basis of promissory estoppel, liability can be 
understood as contractual in the broad sense that the promisor apparently 
intended to assume a legal obligation under an objective standard.”), with 
Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance on 
Illusory Promises, 44 SW. L.J. 841, 901 (1990) (“[T]he argument that promissory 
estoppel is consensual fails because it ignores the express basis on which 
innumerable promissory estoppel decisions have proceeded, and because the 
consent-based theory of promissory liability it presupposes cannot account for 
the courts’ tendency to enforce illusory promises.”).  
17 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), reversed on other grounds, 501 U.S. 663 
(1991). But see Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 378 F.3d 698, 705 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he essence of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
not that the plaintiff have reasonably relied on the defendant’s promise, but 
that he have reasonably relied on its being a promise in the sense of a legal 
commitment, and not a mere prediction or aspiration or bit of puffery.”). 
18 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, PROMISES AND OBLIGATIONS, IN LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 210, 218 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977) (“To 
promise is . . . to communicate an intention to undertake by the very act of 
communication an obligation to perform a certain action.”). 
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presuppose a social convention of promising.19 On the above conception, not all 
promises involve the use of the words “I promise.” But a promise can always be 
translated into a sentence of the form, “I promise to x.” Successful promises in 
this sense are the exercise of a moral normative power: The expression of an 
intention to effect a normative change suffices to do so. 
Some theorists employ broader conceptions of promising. Seana 
Shiffrin, for example, uses “promise” to refer generally to the voluntary 
commitments we make to others, though she allows that there might be 
differences in strength between express promises and others.20 Thomas Scanlon 
suggests that a promise to x is, roughly, the expression of a firm intention to x, 
where the promisee seeks such assurance and the promisor intends to provide 
it.21 A theorist’s conception of what a promise is often tracks her substantive 
commitments about why promises are binding. Thus, some theorists might deny 
that a promise in the above narrow sense, without more, generates a moral 
obligation. 
There are a few more things to say about about promises. To be 
binding, the promisee must accept, or at least not reject, it.22 And a completed 
promise gives the promisee a new normative power: the power to release the 
promisor from her obligation.23 Promises therefore involve three normative 
 
19 See, e.g., Niko Kolodny & R.J. Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 119 (2003). 
20 “[A] promise is a voluntary commitment to perform (or to omit) an action that 
the promisor has the authority to perform, a commitment qualified (sometimes 
explicitly) by apt conditions of performance, that works by transferring some 
form of the promisor’s right to decide whether or not to perform that action to 
the promisee.” Seana Vallentine Shiffrin, Is a Contract a Promise?, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 241, 243–44 (Andrei Marmor ed., 
2012). See also James Penner, Promises, Agreements, and Contracts, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 116, 117-18 (G. Klass, et al. eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (defining “promise” as “a voluntarily undertaken 
obligation which is unilateral in character”). 
21 Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFF. 199, 207 
(1990); T.M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT: NEW 
ESSAYS 86, 103 (P. Benson ed., 2001). See also Neil MacCormick, Voluntary 
Obligations and Normative Powers—I, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 59, 62 (Supp. 
1972) (describing a promise as “an utterance of the speaker’s about his own 
future conduct which is essentially characterized by the speaker’s intending his 
addressee to take it as being intended to induce the addressee to rely upon the 
speaker’s taking the action in question”); P.S. Atiyah, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 
184 (1981) (describing a promise as an admission of the existence of prior 
obligations that “can arise without any intention of assuming an obligation, 
without any consent or express promise”). 
22 David Owens, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 146 (2012). 
23 Id. 
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powers: the promisor’s power to promise, the promisee’s power to accept or to 
reject, and the promisee’s power to release. Finally, like contracts, the 
obligation generated by the promise is content-independent. If a promise to x 
creates a moral obligation to x, it is not because doing x is morally worthy, but 
because of the promise to x. A promise can transform a morally neutral act into 
a morally required one. It is this last feature of promises that Hume 
characterized as “one of the most mysterious and incomprehensible operations 
that can possibly be imagined, [which] may even be compared 
to transubstantiation, or holy orders, where a certain form of words, along with 
a certain intention, changes entirely the nature of an external object, and even 
of a human nature.”24 
1.3 Agreements 
A practical agreement is an agreement that one or both parties shall do 
something, as distinguished, say, from an agreement that something is the case. 
Not all practical agreements involve promises in the above sense. If I agree with 
my friend Christian to read and discuss Michael Tomasello’s new book together, 
I have not necessarily promised to do so. I have not declared my intention to be 
obligated by the very declaration of that intention. We know this is so because if 
Christian doubts whether I will follow through, he might ask, “Do you promise?” 
J.L. Austin compares the difference between nonpromissory agreements and 
promises to that between saying “S is P” and saying “I know S is P.” “But now, 
when I say ‘I promise’, a new plunge is taken; I have not merely announced my 
intention, but, by using this formula (performing the ritual), I have bound myself 
to others, and stake my reputation, in a new way.”25 
What are the defining characteristics of nonpromissory practical 
agreements? This turns out to be a difficult question. Here it is enough to 
observe that such agreements always involve shared intentions: each party has 
an intention about what each shall do; those intentions interlock or mesh with 
one another; and they refer to one another.26 Shared intentions also involve a 
degree of mutual reliance. At a minimum, each person builds the other’s 
intentions and probable performance into her own practical reasoning.27 Shared 
intentions do not, however, require promises. As Margaret Gilbert observes, 
 
24 David Hume, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 524 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford 
Univ. Press 1978) (1739-1740) (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). 
25 J.L. Austin, Other Minds, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 76, 99 (3d ed., 1979). 
26 The above is an abbreviated and incomplete description of Michael Bratman’s 
analysis of shared intentions. See Michael E. Bratman, Shared Intention, 104 
ETHICS 97 (1993). See also Margaret Gilbert, What Is It for Us to Intend?, in 
SOCIALITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 14 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 2002). 
27 Facundo M. Alonso, Shared Intention, Reliance, and Interpersonal Obligations, 
119 ETHICS 444 (2009); Facundo M. Alonso, What is Reliance?, 44 CANADIAN J. 
PHIL. 163 (2014). 
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two people “need not, in fact, mutually express willingness to be jointly 
committed to intend to do A as a body in order to be so committed.”28 
Although one can enter into a nonpromissory agreement to x without 
declaring one’s intention to acquire a moral obligation to x, one might 
nevertheless thereby acquire such an obligation. If I defect from my agreement 
with Christian to read and discuss the book with him, I might wrong him, even if 
I never promised to read. That obligation might derive from any number of 
facts: Christian’s reliance on the agreement, the fact that by agreeing I have 
invited him to trust me, a duty of reciprocity, the value of our friendship, or 
something else.29 The moral duty to perform a nonpromissory agreement 
cannot arise, however, by virtue of a declaration of an intention to undertake 
the obligation. There has been no such declaration. 
Nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations are in several ways 
similar to promissory obligations. The obligations are both voluntary and 
chosen. They are content independent: it is the parties’ agreement to x, as 
distinguished from the moral value of xing, that generates the obligation. Just as 
a promise must be accepted, an agreement is the work of at least two persons 
and can therefore be generated by an offer followed by its acceptance. And 
each side has the power to release the other from the agreement. 
1.4 Voluntary Obligations 
Contracts, promises and agreements all generate voluntary obligations. 
David Owens distinguishes three senses in which an obligation can be said to be 
voluntary.30 An obligation is first grade voluntary if a person’s practical 
decision—her decision to do something—is part of how she acquired the 
obligation, whether or not she knew or intended her act to have that effect. An 
obligation is second grade voluntary if a person’s practical decision put her 
under the obligation only because she made it with the knowledge that it would 
have that effect. An obligation is third grade voluntary if it arose by virtue of the 
obligor’s expression of an intention to, by that expression, acquire the 
obligation. A third-grade voluntary obligation results from the exercise of a 
normative power. It “is an obligation you undertake rather than incur.”31 
Promissory obligations as I have defined them are always third grade 
voluntary. They are exercises of a moral normative power. A nonpromissory 
agreement-based obligation, in distinction, might be either first or second grade 
voluntary. An agreement-based duty always results from a person’s voluntary 
 
28 Gilbert, supra note 26, at 24. See also Margaret Gilbert, Is an Agreement an 
Exchange of Promises?, 90 J. PHIL. 628 (1993). 
29 See Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 695, 701–04 (2012) 
(discussing nonpromissory agreement-based obligations). 
30 Owens, supra note 22, at 3–6. Owens uses the term “choice dependent” 
rather than “voluntary.” 
31 Id. at 127.   
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act—entering into an agreement—and sometimes also the obligor’s knowledge 
that she is acquiring it. 
Under the American rule, a contractual obligation might be first, second 
or third grade voluntary. If the legal obligation attaches because the parties 
have expressed an intent to be legally bound, it is third grade voluntary. This 
describes, for example, formal contracts. If, on the contrary, the law makes 
room for entry into contracts by accident—say by agreeing to an exchange 
unaware of the legal consequences—the resulting legal obligations are only first 
grade voluntary. The Second Restatement, for example, suggests that two 
parties might orally agree to the sale of a book under the mistaken belief that 
their agreement is not enforceable because it is not in writing, yet find 
themselves in a contract.32 Finally, one can imagine a rule that conditions 
contractual liability on the parties’ apparent knowledge that they are entering 
into a legally binding agreement, without requiring that they express an intent 
to do so. The resulting contractual obligations would be second grade voluntary. 
Here a caveat is perhaps in order. Owens’s categorization of voluntary 
obligations turns on the reasons the obligation exists. It might be, for example, 
that the vast majority of parties entering into exchange agreements expect the 
legal obligations that attach to them. That fact would not entail, however, that 
those expectations are part of the law’s reason for attaching the obligations. 
Most adults in the United States know that by earning an income they are likely 
to incur an obligation to pay employment taxes. That knowledge does not, 
however, figure into the law’s reasons for imposing those taxes. The same goes 
for contract law. Even if, as a matter of fact, most parties to exchange 
agreements expect or intend the legal obligations associated with them, we 
need a further argument those expectations or intentions figure into the law’s 
reasons for assigning parties those legal obligations. 
2 Moral Obligations as Explanations for Contract Law 
Having described contracts, promises and nonpromissory agreements, I 
now turn to the relationships between them. This Part identifies several ways in 
which parties’ moral obligations might figure into the explanations of their 
contractual obligations—ways parties’ moral obligations might figure into the 
law’s reasons for assigning them contractual obligations. These are ways in 
which contract law’s purpose or justification might be connected to the moral 
sphere. The next Part discusses theories that do not explain contract law by way 
of the parties’ moral obligations, but suggest that contracts are in an important 
way similar to promises narrowly understood. 
A moral explanatory theory of contract must answer two questions. 
What are contracting parties’ moral obligations to one another? And how do 
those obligations explain the parties’ legal obligations? 
 
32 Second Restatement § 21 ill. 2. 
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2.1 Parties’ Moral Obligations 
The Second Restatement defines “contract” as “a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of 
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.”33 But its definition of 
“promise” is closer to what I am calling “agreement.” “A promise is a 
manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so 
made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been 
made.”34 Nor do the conditions of contractual validity—the rules that determine 
when a contract comes into existence—require that parties promise 
performance. Section 4 of the Second Restatement provides that a “promise 
may be stated in words either oral or written, or maybe inferred wholly or partly 
from conduct.”35 The comments give the following illustration: “A telephones to 
his grocer, ‘Send me a ten-pound bag of flour.’ The grocer sends it. A has 
thereby promised to pay the grocer’s current price therefor.”36 In context, A has 
agreed to pay for the flour. But it is not obvious that A has expressed his 
intention to undertake an obligation (moral or legal) by the very expression of 
that intention. If A had failed to pay for groceries in the past, it would be 
perfectly intelligible for the grocer to reply, “Do you promise to pay for it?” The 
same goes for many express contracts, in which the parties explicitly agree to an 
exchange without promising to perform. Thus the Uniform Commercial Code 
can eschew talk of promises altogether. It defines “contract” as “the total legal 
obligation that results from the parties’ agreement.”37 
One might object that the point is merely semantic. I have adopted a 
narrow conception of promising. If one uses “promise” to refer to the 
acquisition of voluntary obligations generally, as Shiffrin and others do,38 one 
might say that contracts involve promises. But the distinction is an important 
one. 
First, some theorists have identified contract with promise in the 
narrow sense. Charles Fried, for example, suggests that “[a]n individual is 
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a 
convention whose function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to 
expect the promised performance.”39 This looks very much like the narrow 
conception of promises, which fits with Fried’s emphasis on autonomy and 
 
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981). 
34 Id. § 2. 
35 Id. § 4. 
36 Id. ill. 1. 
37 U.C.C. § 1-201(12). 
38 See supra note 20. 
39 Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 16 
(1981). See also, id. at 57 (“The moral force behind contract as promise is 
autonomy: the parties are bound to their contract because they have chosen to 
be.”). 
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freedom of contract. But then one might doubt the premise of his central claim: 
that “since a contract is first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because 
a promise must be kept.”40 Many contracts do not involve promises in the sense 
Fried uses the term.41 
Second, recognizing that contracts more often involve agreements than 
promises per se answers a possible objection to moral accounts of contract law. 
Michael Pratt has observed that one might enter into a contract while 
effectively disclaiming a promise to perform.42 This fact is fairly unsurprising. 
Because a promise is just an expression of an intent to undertake an obligation 
by the very expression of that intent, promissory obligations can always be 
avoided in this way. It is not obvious, however, that one can so avoid 
nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations. Such obligations might be 
more like those that attach to friendship, which cannot be forestalled by simple 
disclaimer. (It would be extremely odd to say to someone, “Although I consider 
you a friend, I hereby disclaim any moral obligations of amity toward you.”) The 
same might go for the nonpromissory moral obligations that attach to 
contractual agreements.43 
Third, several scholars have sought to reconcile economic analyses of 
contract law with promissory theories by emphasizing promisors’ control over 
their obligations.44 The argument is that a promisor has the power to specify not 
only the content of her first-order moral obligation to perform, but also what 
she will owe the promisee if she fails to perform. This radical malleability of 
promissory obligations, these theorists argue, renders economic arguments for 
the expectation remedy, including the theory of efficient breach, compatible 
with promissory theories of contract. If economic analysis shows that 
 
40 Id. at 17. 
41 P.S. Atiyah makes something like this point in his review of Contract as 
Promise. “The promises of the parties are legal constructs that cannot be 
identified until we have decided what the parties ought to do. Obligation comes 
first, promise afterwards.” P.S. Atiyah, Book Review, 95 HARV. L. REV. 509, 519 
(1981) (reviewing Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981)). 
42 Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 FLA. ST. L. REV. 801 (2008). 
43 This is, in essence, Shiffrin’s response to Pratt, though Shiffrin uses “promise” 
in a broader sense than I do. See Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 245–48. 
44 Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of 
Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Daniel Markovits & Alan 
Schwartz, The Myth of Efficiency Breach: New Defenses of the Expectation 
Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011). The above skips over important differences 
in nuance, but I believe gets at a common mode of argument. For more detailed 
assessments of Markovits and Schwartz’s version, see Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 VA. L. REV. 159 (2012); 
Gregory Klass, To Perform or Pay Damages, 98 VA. L. REV. 143 (2012). 
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sophisticated promisors prefer remedies that allow for efficient breach, the 
expectation measure can be understood “as the law’s best guess about the 
remedial moral duty that most promisors would prefer.”45 
I have my doubts about whether promissory obligations are so 
malleable. Joseph Raz, for example, has argued that though promisors have the 
ability to limit the circumstances that excuse their performance, they do not 
have the ability to affect the strength of the reason to perform.46 
Be that as it may, the above reconciliation strategy is much less 
plausible when applied to nonpromissory agreement-based obligations. Just as 
it is not obvious that nonpromissory agreement-based obligations can be 
avoided by simple disclaimer, it is not obvious that one who incurs such an 
obligation has the power to affect its strength or the remedial obligations that 
attach to its breach. Jody Kraus has argued that “[i]f personal sovereignty 
explains and justifies promissory obligations on the ground that they vindicate 
the will of the individuals who incur them, then the remedial moral duties, if 
any, that attach to the violation of those obligations should also be subject to 
the will of the individuals who create the obligations.”47 It is not obvious that 
such autonomy-based arguments apply pari passu to nonpromissory 
agreement-based obligations, which are only first or second grade voluntary. 
Finally, and more generally: In our everyday moral reasoning, we often 
attach a special weight or significance to promissory obligations. To ask for a 
promise is to ask for an extra assurance. To promise is to render 
nonperformance more wrongful than it otherwise would be. In thinking about 
the possible relationship between parties moral and contractual obligations, the 
source and character of their moral obligations matter. 
2.2 Moral Explanatory Theories 
If parties’ contractual obligations are explained, in part or in full, by 
their moral obligations, then those moral obligations stem from agreements to 
perform that might or might not involve promises. I have not yet argued that 
parties always have a moral obligation to perform. Does a consumer who is 
legally bound to click-wrap adhesive terms, which it would have been irrational 
for her to read and which she predictably ignored, have a moral obligation to 
abide by those terms?48 If a residential mortgage is securitized and then 
purchased by an institutional investor in a bet on the housing market, does the 
homeowner have a moral obligation to pay it back, even if it is in the 
 
45 Kraus, supra note 44, at 1635.  
46 Joseph Raz, Is There a Reason to Keep a Promise?, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 58, 64–65 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2014). 
47 Kraus, supra note 44, at 1629–30. 
48 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014). 
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homeowner’s financial interest to default?49 What about an agreement 
between two corporations, each of whose officers understand her and her 
counterpart’s primary duty to be to maximize shareholder returns?50 
This chapter does not seek to answer such questions. Instead, this Part 
assumes arguendo that at least some contracting parties have a moral 
obligation to perform in order to ask how such obligations might figure into the 
explanatory reasons for the associated legal obligations. The next Part discusses 
several theories that make no such assumptions about parties’ moral 
obligations. 
Parties’ moral obligations might figure into the explanation of their 
contractual ones in any of four ways: contract law might be designed enforce 
the first-order moral obligation to perform; it might enforce, or empower 
parties to enforce,51 second-order remedial duties generated by the breach of 
their first-order obligations; it might seek to provide support to the social moral 
practice of making and keeping agreements; or it might be structured at least to 
avoid interfering with parties’ moral lives or doing harm to the moral practice.52 
The first two types of explanation posit that contract law enforces parties’ moral 
obligations, first- or second-order. The second two focus on the law’s effects on 
moral culture and agency. 
Least plausible is the claim that contract law is designed only to enforce 
parties’ first-order moral obligations to perform. Liam Murphy identifies the two 
reasons for doubt.53 First, contract remedies seem designed not to punish or 
deter breach, but to compensate the nonbreaching party for harms caused by 
breach. Murphy argues that if the goal were to enforce performance, the 
presumptive remedy would be at least specific performance. My own view is 
 
49 See Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths about 
Strategic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2011); Tess Wilkinson Ryan, 
Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic 
Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547 (2011). 
50 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003) (suggesting that artificial persons are 
subject only to the morality required by positive law). 
51 The possible application of recourse theories to the law of contracts deserves 
more than the above nod but would require a significant detour. See John 
Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917 (2010) 
(describing the civil recourse theory); Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A 
Civil Recourse Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011) (seeking 
to marry civil recourse theory with a consent theory). 
52 For variations on this list, see Liam Murphy The Practice of Promise and 
Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 151 (G. Klass et al. eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2014); Klass, supra note 29, at 707–09. 
53 Murphy, supra note 52, at 156–58. Although Murphy focuses on Fried’s 
promise theory, his points apply equally to the idea that contract law might 
enforce nonpromissory agreement-based moral obligations. 
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that not even specific performance would be enough. Specific performance 
does not enforce the duty to perform, as it does not ensure that the 
nonbreaching party gets what she bargained for: the other side’s willing 
performance. Specific performance provides instead only a judicially mandated 
substitute for performance, secured through litigation. A contract law designed 
to enforce the moral obligation to perform would include punitive damages, 
disgorgement or other deterrence based remedies.54 Either way, however, the 
general point remains: remedies for breach do not appear to enforce 
performance obligations. 
Second, enforcing the moral duty to perform violates the liberal 
commitment to maintaining the distinction between the right and the good. 
“For Millian liberals, who reject coercion merely for the sake of improving a 
person’s own welfare, or enforcing their obligations, or making them more 
virtuous, the moralist view of contract law does not get off the ground.”55 
Performance duties are not the sort of moral obligations a liberal society wants 
the law to enforce. 
If contract law does not aim to enforce a first-order moral obligation to 
perform, it might seek to enforce second-order moral obligations generated by 
nonperformance. Theories of corrective justice come in many varieties, some 
more convincing than others.56 My own view is that a plausible account for a 
theory of contract law starts from Joseph Raz’s “conformity principle,” which 
John Gardner restates as follows: 
 
When we have a primary obligation to  at t1, but do not to  at t1, we 
acquire, all else being equal, a secondary obligation to come as close as 
we now can to ing at t1, where closeness is determined by the reasons 
for the original obligation. This may involve nearly ing at t2, or 
 
54 Although several theorists have recommended disgorgement for certain 
forms of breach, and the idea made it into the Third Restatement of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, U.S. courts have not followed suit. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2010); Andrew Kull, 
Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465 (1994) 
(advocating disgorgement for some breaches); Hanoch Dagan, THE LAW AND 
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 261–82 (2004) (examining the moral complexities of 
disgorgement for breach); Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOYOLA L. REV. 
131, 134 (2008) (arguing that section 39 has little support in U.S. caselaw). 
55 Id. at 157. 
56 For discussions the application of corrective justice theories to contract law, 
see Murphy, id. at 158–62; Curtis Bridgeman, Note: Corrective Justice in 
Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237 
(2003). 
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precisely ing at t3, or (eventually) doing something at t27 that has 
something in common with ing.57 
 
In short, “the secondary obligation is a rational echo of the primary obligation, 
for it exists to serve, so far as may still be done, the reasons for the primary 
obligation that was not performed when its performance was due.”58 If the 
reasons for a party’s first-order moral obligation to perform a contractual 
agreement include, for example, an uncompensated benefit conferred on her by 
the other party or the other party’s detrimental reliance on the agreement, 
those reasons survive nonperformance and arguably generate a second-order 
moral duty to compensate. 
There is an argument that such remedial moral obligations cannot 
explain contract remedies. Contract law enforces executory agreements, which 
have not yet been relied on or performed by either side. And recovery often 
takes the form of expectation damages, which as Lon Fuller observes, claim to 
“’compensate’ the plaintiff by giving him something he never had”—the benefit 
of performance.59 These remedial rules might be thought to belie the idea that 
contract remedies enforce second-order duties that derive from benefits 
received or detrimental reliance. Alternatively, some theorists address this 
worry with arguments that contract is better understood instead as the transfer 
of an entitlement or the creation of a right to performance.60 
My view is that such metaphysical moves are unnecessary.61 As Fuller 
observes, one often finds a divergence between the “measure” of damages and 
the “motive” for imposing them. Fuller identifies two reasons. First, an area of 
 
57 John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 38 (2011). 
58 Id. at 40. Raz’s formulation is: “One should conform to reason completely, 
insofar as one can. If one cannot, one should come as close to complete 
conformity as possible.” Joseph Raz, Personal Practical Conflicts, in PRACTICAL 
CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 172, 189 (Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler 
eds., Cambridge U. Press 2004). 
59 L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53 (1936). 
60 See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(2009); Peter Benson, Contract as a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1673 (2007); Ernst Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract 
Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003). Alternatively, P.S. Atiyah simply 
suggested we “dethrone the executory contract from the central place which it 
occupies in Contract theory.” P.S. Atiyay, Contracts, Promises and the Law of 
Obligations, 94 L.Q. REV. 193, 220 (1978). 
61 David Owens argues that transfer theories also mischaracterize promissory 
obligations. David Owens, Does a Promise Transfer a Right, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 78 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
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law might serve multiple functions or be justified by multiple principles.62 If the 
law has “mixed motives,” the remedy might not perfectly match each function 
or justification, or even the primary ones. Second, practical considerations such 
as difficulties in proof or measurement often recommend an alternative 
remedy. “[E]ven where it is reasonable to suppose that a single interest 
furnishes the exclusive raison d’être of legal intervention it is still possible for 
reasons of convenience and certainty the court may choose a measure of 
recovery which differs from that suggested by the interested protected.”63 
Remedies for breach might serve to enforce second-order moral obligations 
without perfectly tracking the reasons for those obligations. 
The above discussion has not yet made a complete case for a corrective 
justice theory of contract law. That case would, among other things, need to 
explain why if the law does not strictly enforce the first-order moral obligation 
to perform, it should enforce the second-order moral obligations that result 
from breach. Here Mill’s harm principle might be of some use. Be that as it may, 
corrective justice accounts at least perform better on the dimension of fit. 
Contract remedies appear designed not so much to punish or deter breach as to 
compensate the nonbreaching party for the harms breach causes.  
A third variety of moral explanation emphasizes law’s broader social 
functions. Several scholars have suggested that contract law is designed not (or 
not only) to enforce parties’ moral obligations, but instead (or in addition) to 
support the social practice of entering into and keeping morally binding 
agreements. Raz, for example, argues that Mill’s harm principle casts doubt on 
“the legitimacy of the law’s adoption of a general principle of enforcing 
voluntary obligations,” but “does not preclude the law from encouraging moral, 
cultural or other valid goals.”64 Along the same lines, Shiffrin suggests that 
contract law “is not an effort to legalize as much as possible the interpersonal 
moral regime of promising, but rather to provide support for the political and 
public values associated with promising.”65 
The function that these social-effects accounts attribute to contract law 
relies on an empirical claim: that by recognizing and enforcing agreement-based 
moral obligations, the law strengthens moral culture. The interaction between 
moral culture and legal enforcement, however, is complex. Dori Kimel, for 
example, has hypothesized that “enforceability casts a thick and all-
encompassing veil over the motives and the attitudes towards each other . . . 
leaving reliance, performance, and other aspects of contractual conduct largely 
 
62 Fuller & Perdue, supra note 59, at 66 (“[I]t is impossible to assume that when 
a court enforces a promise it necessarily pursues only one purpose and protects 
only one ‘interest’.”). 
63 Id. at 66–67. 
64 Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937 (reviewing 
P.S. Atiyah, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981)). 
65 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 708, 752 (2007). See also Murphy, supra note 52, at 168–70. 
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devoid of expressive content.”66 Or consider the famous Israeli day-care 
experiment in which imposing a late-pickup fine on parents apparently 
undermined a social norm of picking children up on time, rather than re-
enforcing it.67 None of this is to say that legal enforcement cannot be used to 
support moral practices. (I am skeptical, for example, of Kimel’s veil hypothesis.) 
But the question of when and how it does so cannot be answered in the 
abstract, and is likely to be highly context dependent.68 
The same goes for a fourth possible moral explanation. Whether or not 
contract law supports the social practice of making and keeping agreements, we 
should at least want it not to undermine that practice. At a minimum contract 
law should, in Shiffrin’s words, “be made compatible with the conditions for 
moral agency to flourish.”69 
This do-no-harm principle is attractive. But its application again involves 
difficult empirical judgments. Shiffrin, for example, argues that by refusing to 
order specific performance and declining to award unforeseeable damages, 
contract law “fails to use its distinctive powers and modes of expression to mark 
the judgment that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a 
price.”70 But are we certain about those rules’ expressive content and practical 
effects? By awarding the expected value of performance, the law might be 
understood to recognize the moral duty to perform while declining to enforce it. 
And the foreseeability rule might be read to reflect each party’s obligation, at 
the time of formation, to share information about the costs of 
nonperformance.71 Claims about the deleterious effects of individual contract 
doctrines on moral culture or agency are no less empirical than those 
concerning support for those practices, and resist armchair answers for the 
same reasons. 
 
66 Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract 74 (2005). See also Aditi Bagchi, 
Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 707 (2011) (arguing that 
legal enforcement of private, morally binding promises interferes and 
undermines the moral sphere). 
67 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
68 For a start in thinking about empirically assessing whether contract 
enforcement supports the moral practice, see Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal 
Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 843 (2012). For more 
on the complex interaction between legal enforcement and extralegal norms 
and behavior, see, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property 
Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 219 (2001). 
69 Shiffrin, supra note 65, at 712. 
70 Id. at 724. 
71 George Letsas and Prince Saprai have similarly argued that the mitigation rule 
has a moral meaning different from the one Shiffrin assigns it. George Letsas & 
Prince Saprai Mitigation, Fairness, and Contract Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 319 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
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Before leaving moral explanatory theories, I want to return to the 
various senses in which contractual obligations might be said to be voluntary. I 
have argued that contracting parties’ moral obligations are often only first or 
second grade voluntary. None of the above theories presupposes that parties’ 
legal obligations are voluntary in a more demanding sense. They do not 
presuppose that contracting is a legal normative power, that the law seeks to 
ensure that parties intend the contractual obligations they acquire. None of the 
above functions contract law might serve—enforcing the parties’ first- or 
second-order moral obligations, supporting the moral practice, or doing no 
harm to that practice—assumes parties’ intent to contract, though all are 
compatible with parties sometimes or even always intending to be legally 
bound. Moral explanatory theories therefore allow that contractual obligations 
might be first, second or third grade voluntary. 
3 Separate Spheres and the Similarity of Promise and Contract 
Several theoretical approaches reject the idea that the parties’ 
contractual obligations are explained by their moral ones, but view contracting 
as something like the legal analog of promising. Entering into a contract, 
according to these theories, is the exercise of a legal normative power, in the 
same way making a promise is the exercise of a moral normative one. I begin 
with two arguments that entering into a contract is always the exercise of a 
normative power—that contract law is, or should be, designed to sort for the 
parties’ intent to be legally bound. I then consider the more modest claim that 
contracting is sometimes the exercise of a normative power—that the parties’ 
apparent intent to be legally bound might be a sufficient reason for 
enforcement without being a necessary one. 
3.1 Contract Law as Pure Power-Conferring Rule 
Randy Barnett advances a strong version of the claim that contracting is 
a normative power. Rather than looking to the moral sphere, Barnett seeks to 
ground contract law a neo-Lockean theory of legal entitlements.72 That theory 
begins with a commitment to promoting individuals’ ability to pursue and 
achieve happiness, peace, and prosperity. In a world of scarce resources, those 
individual pursuits can come into conflict. Legal entitlements mediate such 
conflicts. “A theory of entitlements specifies the rights that individuals possess 
 
72 A detailed version of the theory can be found in Randy E. Barnett, THE 
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
Barnett expressly rejects any explanatory connection between parties’ moral 
and legal obligations. To enforce the moral obligation would be “tantamount to 
enforcing virtue,” confusing the good with the right. Randy E. Barnett, Contract 
Is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 
LAW 42, 47 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
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or may possess; it tells us what may be owned and who owns it; it circumscribes 
the individual boundaries of human freedom.”73 The commitment to individual 
choice further recommends permitting persons to transfer their legal 
entitlements when they wish—for example, by entering into a contract that 
gives the other side a legal entitlement to one’s future performance. 
Barnett’s autonomy theory understands entering into a contract as the 
exercise of a legal power. 
 
In a system of entitlements where manifested rights transfers are what 
justify the legal enforcement of agreements, any such manifestation 
necessarily implies that one intends to be “legally bound,” to adhere to 
one’s commitment. Therefore, the phrase “a manifestation of an 
intention to be legally bound” neatly captures what a court should seek 
to find before holding that a contractual obligation has been created.74 
 
Barnett’s consent theory recommends the English rule: contract liability should 
attach when and only when the parties intend that their agreement be 
enforceable. In U.S. jurisdictions, where that rule is not part of the black-letter 
law, other doctrines and tacit judicial judgments can in practice sort for the 
parties intent to contract.75 Although Barnett does not put it this way, contract 
emerges as the legal analog to promise. Just as promising gives individuals the 
power to undertake new moral obligations when they wish, so contract law 
gives parties the power to undertake new legal ones. 
Economic analyses of contract law start from a very different place, but 
commonly arrive at a similar picture of contracting. Economic theorists typically 
model contractual exchanges as transactions between self-interested rational 
utility maximizers. Most further assume that parties are insensitive to any moral 
obligations that attached to their exchange agreements, but highly attuned to 
the legal consequences of nonperformance.76 Rational choice theory and 
 
73 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 291 
(1986). See generally id. at 290–300. For a recent restatement, see Randy E. 
Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract is Consent, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 42 (G. Klass et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
74 Id. at 304 (footnotes omitted).  
75 See id. at 313 (arguing that consideration sorts for intent to contract); Barnett 
& Becker, supra note 16, 449-85 (arguing that in most cases in which courts 
apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the parties intended legal liability). 
76 For an example of a model that drops the first assumption but keeps the 
second, see Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of 
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 2029–31 (2009). For general thoughts 
on expanding economic models to take account of parties’ moral obligations 
and motivations, see Rebecca Stone, Legal Design for the “Good Man”, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1767 (2016); Eyal Zamir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: 
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microeconomic analysis are then applied to determine the incentive effects of 
various legal rules. Early economic analyses of contract law focused on the legal 
incentives to perform, arguing that in the model, expectation damages 
incentivize performance when and only when performance is efficient.77 Later 
analyses paid more attention to the legal incentives on both parties across the 
life of the transaction—from investing in the possible deal before formation to 
post-breach behavior.78 
Practitioners of economic analysis have not paid much attention to 
whether the law should condition enforcement on parties’ contractual intent. 
The reason might be that economic theories of law are more common in the 
United States, where the doctrinal question is not especially salient. Or it might 
be because the answer is so obvious given the approach’s methodological 
commitments, which suggest at least three reasons to think that the law does or 
should condition contractual liability on the parties’ intent to contract. 
First, the assumption that parties are highly attuned to legal 
consequences entails that parties know when they are entering into a legally 
binding contract. To the extent that parties are able avoid legal liability when 
they wish—by specifying that their agreement shall not be legally enforceable—
the model suggests that parties who do not opt-out of enforcement must want 
it.79 
Second, in the model parties often want legal enforcement. The 
assumptions of party self-interest and insensitivity to moral obligations entail 
that, absent legal enforcement, parties might not trust in one another’s future 
performance.80 Reputation and repeat play sometimes suffice. But in the model, 
there is often a Hobbesian problem: “he that performeth first has no assurance 
that the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to 
brindle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of 
 
Integrating Moral Constraints within Economic Analysis of Law, 96 CAL. L. REV. 
323 (2008). 
77 See Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 
LAW 362 (G. Klass, et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014). 
78 See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE 
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 19 (P. Benson ed., Cambridge U. Press 
2001). 
79 See id. at 42–43 (suggesting that enforcement of contractual agreements is a 
majoritarian default and therefore compatible with a requirement that the 
parties intend legal liability); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient 
Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996) (using economic analysis to determine 
when parties are likely to want enforcement, and using the results to identify 
majoritarian defaults). 
80 Many but not all. Reputation and repeat play can also provide reasons to 
perform. 
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some coercive power.”81 Legal enforcement solves this mistrust problem by 
both deterring many breaches and insuring the nonbreaching party against 
those that occur. Because parties stand to benefit from value-creating 
exchanges, both therefore often want legal enforcement of their exchange 
agreements. 
Third, many economic theorists incorporate into their analyses a further 
assumption: that parties know what is in their individual self-interest better 
than do lawmakers or courts. That premise suggests giving parties the power to 
determine when and how their agreements should be enforced. Lisa Bernstein, 
for example, writes that “[i]n structuring their contracting relationship, 
transactors allocate aspects of their relationship between the legal and 
extralegal realms in ways that seek to maximize the value of their transaction.”82 
The rules of contract interpretation and enforcement, in turn, should be 
structured to maximize parties’ ability to choose the legal obligations they 
wish.83 
This point brings us full-circle back to autonomy theories. Charles Fried 
has recently observed a convergence between autonomy theories and 
economic analysis, which he attributes to their shared commitment to the 
proposition that “the law should be designed to allow people in voluntary 
relationship to structure their relationship in the way that they judge will best 
serve their interests over the long run, at least insofar as they may be deemed 
the best judges of their own interests.”84The upshot is that, like Barnett’s 
autonomy theory, economic analyses picture contract as legal normative power. 
Contractual obligations are third grade voluntary—not incurred, but 
undertaken. 
Neither autonomy nor economic theories ground parties’ contractual 
obligations in their moral ones. Neither treat contracts as promises. But both 
understand contracts as similar to promises. Entering into a contract is the 
intentional undertaking of a new legal obligation, just as promising is the 
intentional undertaking of a moral one. Contracting is the exercise of a legal 
normative power in the same way promising is the exercise of a moral 
normative power. 
 
81 Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 84 (E. Curly ed., Hackett 1994) (1651). Richard 
Posner opens his analysis of contract by describing a version of Hobbes’s 
mistrust problem. Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93 (6th ed., Aspen 
2003). 
82 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Codes Search 
for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788 (1996). 
83 Bernstein argues, for example, that the Uniform Commercial Code’s rules 
regarding course of performance and course of dealings reduce parties’ ability 
to get the legal terms they want. Id. at 1804. 
84 Charles Fried, The Ambitions of Contract as Promise, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 17, 22 (G. Klass, et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
2014). 
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3.2 Contract Law as a Partial Power-Conferring Rule 
Both Barnett’s consent theory and economic models suggest that the 
parties’ intent to be legally bound should, to the extent practicable, be a 
necessary condition of contractual liability. One need not be committed to 
either theory, however, to recognize that giving parties the legal power to 
undertake contractual obligations when they wish expands their autonomy, and 
that this is a good thing. No matter how common Hobbes’s mistrust problem, 
there is no doubt that contract law sometimes allows parties to enter into joint 
projects that would otherwise fail for a lack of trust. As Hanoch Dagan and 
Michael Heller observe, contract law “empowers individuals . . . to make 
agreements that facilitate their ability legitimately to enlist one another in 
pursuing private goals and purposes—and thus contract law enhances our 
ability to be the authors of our own lives.”85 Contract law does this by giving 
parties the ability to undertake new legal obligations when they wish. 
Such an autonomy-enhancing function of contract law presumes that 
parties sometimes intend legal liability and that this is a sufficient reason to 
provide it. It does not, however, presuppose that parties always intend to 
contract—that evidence of the parties’ intent to contract should be a necessary 
condition of contractual liability. In short, the positive freedom to enter a 
contract when one wishes does not presuppose a negative freedom from 
unintended contracts. 
4 The Plural Functions of Contract Law 
All of the theories discussed in this article are broadly speaking 
interpretive ones. Each seeks to identify the functions and justifications that 
best explain the law of contract we find in the world around us. One group 
locates the explanation in the parties’ agreement-based moral obligations. 
Contract law might function to enforce parties’ first-order moral obligations to 
perform, to enforce the second-order remedial obligations that attach to 
breach, to support the moral practice and culture of making and keeping 
agreements, or to at least do no harm to that practice and culture. Another 
group explains the law of contract without recourse to the parties’ moral 
obligations, but pictures contract as the legal analog to promise. Rather than 
pointing to parties’ moral obligations, these theories emphasize ways that 
contract law expands individual autonomy and adds to welfare. Although they 
do not posit an explanatory connection between contract and the moral sphere, 
they tend to view contract as a legal normative power that is very much like the 
moral normative power of promising. 
There is a strong tendency among contract theorists to adopt one or 
another of the above two approaches—one or the other of these pictures of 
contract. But there is no inconsistency between them. Contract law might 
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function to enforce parties’ agreement-based moral obligations and support 
moral culture generally and at the same time, by enabling parties to 
intentionally enter into legally binding agreements, serve to extend their ability 
to engage in joint projects. 
In previous work I have called this the “compound theory” of contract.86 
Whereas most laws can be classified as either duty-imposing or power-
conferring, contract law appears to be both at once. It both imposes on parties 
to exchange agreements a legal obligation to perform for reasons independent 
of the parties’ probable contractual intent, and confers on them the power to 
undertake that legal obligation when they so intend because they so intend. The 
law is structured to make room for contractual obligations that are first grade 
voluntary and at the same time recognizes and enables third grade voluntary 
contractual obligations. 
The compound theory is a form of pluralism: it understands contract law 
as a multi-purpose tool.87 But it is a structured pluralism. The individual 
functions contract law serves give it a distinctive dual structure. Contract law 
both imposes duties on parties to exchange agreements and gives those parties 
the power to undertake new legal obligations and restructure their existing 
ones. I have argued elsewhere that the compound theory provides the best 
interpretation of the rules of contract formation and construction we find in the 
world around us, especially those that govern formation. Here I merely note 
that a compound theory also accounts for an aspect of contract law that simple 
theories tend to obscure. 
Whereas simple moral theories tend to view contract law as responding 
to parties’ exogenously given moral obligations, a compound theory suggests 
that the law might also serve to identify and structure them. The point here is 
akin to Hart’s observation that the law seeks not only to deter the Holmesian 
bad man (an idea that reappears in economic accounts), but also to give 
guidance to the puzzled one.88 Lawmakers can and do set defaults and 
mandatory rules to take account of shared social understandings of what parties 
owe one another. These can range from the morally thin obligations between, 
say, traders in the derivatives market to much thicker obligations, such as those 
between employers and employees or landlords and tenants. By the same 
token, parties who know they are entering into a legally binding agreement can 
look to legal default and mandatory terms for information about not only their 
 
86 Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound Rule, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726 (2008). Peter Benson has recently advanced a somewhat 
different version of a compound theory. Peter Benson, Unity and Multiplicity in 
Contract Law: From General Principles to Transaction Types, 20 THEOR. INQ. L. 
537 (2019). See also Curtis Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises 
Distinguish Contract from Tort?, 45 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 873, 876–79 (2012). 
87 See Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 915 (2012). 
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legal obligations, but also their moral ones. The compound theory explains how 
it is that contract law can in this way both respond to and structure parties’ 
moral relationships. Contractual obligations can be both first- and third-grade 
voluntary, and contract law can be one and the same time both a duty-imposing 
and a power-conferring rule. 
